Executive Summary
The aim of this research paper is to explain the mechanism and consequences of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union ('Brexit') and the plan to establish a British Bill of Rights.
The key points of the research paper are:  Regarding plans to repeal the Human Rights Act (HRA) and its replacement by a British Bill of Rights (BBR), this would not free the UK from its obligations to comply with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in cases where the UK is a respondent party. In fact, it might lead to an increase in the number of successful applications to the Strasbourg Court, diminish the possibility for meaningful dialogue between the Strasbourg Court and the British courts, and thereby amplify rather than lessen the impact of Strasbourg case-law. The only viable way to remove such obligations is for the UK to denounce (leave) the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR).
 Repeal of the HRA, its replacement with a BBR, and other related policy pledges seeking to reduce the application of international human rights law to UK actors, all ultimately appear to set a path toward withdrawal from the ECHR.
 In this connection, it was noted that UK withdrawal from the ECHR system would be likely to lead to withdrawal from the Council of Europe, which would significantly undermine the UK's reputation as a state that cares about human rights protection.
The UK would be only the second country in Europe which is not a member of the Council of Europe; the other being Belarus with its very problematic human rights  Brexit poses real threats to the fragile peace in Northern Ireland, given that EU membership is central to the Good Friday Agreement, and given that EU law is 7 dominant in areas that are clear 'flash points' for discord between the parties in the consociational government, such as equality legislation.
 Plans for repeal of the HRA, its replacement by a BBR, and other related policy pledges, pose threats not only to rights protection in the UK, but also to the rights protection (albeit limited) provided by the ECHR system in other states of the Council of Europe, given that UK withdrawal from the ECHR would be likely to trigger withdrawal by other states, such as Russia and Azerbaijan.
 The most fundamental conclusion from the workshop is that the current governmental approach to Brexit and a British Bill of Rights does not adequately appreciate, or address, the extraordinary complexity of human rights protection in the UK, which enmeshes protections across the international, EU, State, devolved, and bilateral planes. Until, and unless, policy formation begins to fully grapple with this complexity, serious rule of law and legitimacy questions will hang over the solutions presented by the Conservative government to the current constitutional entanglement.
Foreword by the editors
The Conservative Party manifesto of 2015 1 contained two key policy pledges: the holding of a referendum on the UK's continued membership of the European Union (EU); 2 and a plan to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 and replace it with a British Bill of Rights. 3 The
Conservative government elected in the general election of 7 May 2015 has delivered on the first pledge, although the consequences of the referendum result, supporting the UK's exit from the EU ('Brexit') is far from clear. The government has not yet pursued the second pledge with the same vigour, but it remains a central plank of the platform for government.
This research paper provides an overview of a number of key legal questions raised by the Conservative government's plans, emphasising the complexity involved; a complexity which tends to be elided in current government policy formation. The paper is intentionally succinct and does not claim to be exhaustive.
Detailed policy and academic discussions have of course already taken place, and continue to take place, concerning the legal and political complexities and uncertainties surrounding Brexit, since the results of the referendum vote were announced on 24 June 2016. However, despite this, discussion has often failed to capture the full extent of this complexity. In addition, the plan for a British Bill of Rights (BBR) has been eclipsed by Brexit. Yet, as this report reveals, the two developments are closely linked and the BBR presents an added dimension to the extraordinarily complex constitutional entanglement presented by Brexit, as well as raising fundamental questions beyond the Brexit context. 
Part I

Concrete Reduction in Rights Protection
Introduction
Although public discussion concerning Brexit has largely focused on the economic and international relations dimensions, a central additional concern is the impact of the UK's exit from the EU on human rights protection within the UK.
Loss of rights contained in EU law
Brexit clearly presents an overall reduction in the formal protection for human rights within the UK. Departure from the European Union (EU) means that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights would disappear from the UK legal order, as there is currently no relationship in existence between the EU and a third country that would continue its applicability.
The Charter is more limited in the scope of its application to the UK than the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but is substantively broader. The Charter only applies where a public authority in the UK 'is implementing' EU law. By contrast, the ECHR applies directly in the UK via the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) to all acts of public authorities.
Removal of the Charter means removal of a variety of rights therein that are not protected by other texts in force in the UK, such as an express right to data protection, specific rights of the child, and social rights, as well as the more expansive protection of rights which have a counterpart in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It was also observed that under the Great Repeal Bill Ministers are likely to be endowed with rather robust powers to amend legislation, and that it would be important to scrutinise the detail of both the primary legislation and secondary legislation enacted, which both intentionally and unintentionally may water down human rights protection.
More broadly, it was observed that the removal of the Charter from the UK legal system represents a weakening of the human rights protection framework as a whole -a certain 'disentrenchment' of human rights, reversing the decades-long trend toward incremental expansion in the right protection afforded to individuals across the UK.
Potential mitigation of Brexit-related rights reduction
As against this, participants discussed the possibility that some elements of the remaining rights framework might temper these losses. These include:
 Rights protections afforded by the common law (i.e. protections in judicial decisions, rather than statutory law);
 Interpretation of the UK's anti-discrimination laws remaining linked to ECJ judgments;
 The fact that lawyers and judges will not simply 'unlearn' EU law overnight; and  The UK's continuing obligations under other, non-EU, international human rights treaties (e.g. the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child).
However, it was recognised that many of these protections would be weak. The first possibility in particular relates to 'common law constitutionalism' -an approach to law, gaining ground in recent years, which tends to support a reinvigoration of the common law as a primary pillar of constitutional government and a constitutional politics grounded in fundamental common law principles (including protection of rights under the common law), and which tends to accord a more central place to the courts. However, it was noted by one participant that common law constitutionalism, as it currently stands, does not provide rights protection equivalent to the rights that would be 'lost' through Brexit. It was also observed that common law constitutionalism has been a particular disappointment in
Northern Ireland for decades, especially as far as rights protection is concerned. 5
As regards other rights treaties, the modalities for their enforcement are different and generally weaker than enforcement of EU law. There is no equivalent of the primacy and direct application of EU law in national orders, and the resources and powers of oversight bodies of many international treaties are not comparable to those of the ECJ (e.g. the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), a body of 18 Independent experts that monitors domestic implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, receives periodic reports and issues general comments, but the UK has not ratified an optional protocol to permit individual complaints to the CRC).
Fresh impetus to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: A silver lining?
It was observed that a 'silver lining' of Brexit in Northern Ireland may be the fresh impetus to the adoption of • the formulation of a general obligation on government and public bodies fully to respect, on the basis of equality of treatment, the identity and ethos of both communities in Northern Ireland; and
• a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated against and to equality of opportunity in both the public and private sectors.
The 'forgotten' all-Ireland charter of rights
It was noted at the Workshop that the Good Friday Agreement also envisages discussion of a form of All-Ireland 'charter' of rights. However, this aspect of the Agreement has been largely ignored since 1998 and represents further 'unfinished business' from the Agreement.
An all-Ireland Charter of Rights
Paragraph 10, under the heading 'Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity' in the Good Friday Agreement, states:
It is envisaged that there would be a joint committee of representatives of the two Human Rights Commissions, North and South, as a forum for consideration of human rights issues in the island of Ireland. The joint committee will consider, among other matters, the possibility of establishing a charter, open to signature by all democratic political parties, reflecting and endorsing agreed measures for the protection of the fundamental rights of everyone living in the island of Ireland.
The potential and pitfalls of a British Bill of Rights
Regarding a separate British Bill of Rights (BBR), a key point of discussion was whether moving towards such a Bill of Rights represents a step toward a more mature constitutionalism in the UK, or whether the process would be 'captured' by political interests eager to achieve a narrowing of rights protection. Other participants voiced the strong concern that, given the likely drafters of a BBR within the prevailing political climate, a BBR would inevitably bring in a reduction in rights protection (and it was recognised, in this connection, that all human rights commissions in the UK are firmly opposed to any such regression in rights protection). 
Part II
Consent Introduction
Regarding Brexit, the process of withdrawal from the EU is governed by Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and can be presented as five separate stages:
 UK decision to withdraw in accordance with the UK's constitutional requirements;
 Notifying the European Council of the UK's intention to withdraw;
 Negotiation between the UK and the EU on the terms of the withdrawal;
 If the negotiation is successful, exit takes place;
 If the negotiation is not successful the UK will automatically leave the EU without a negotiated deal after two years (unless an extension is unanimously agreed by the 27 remaining Member States). Spanning domestic law, EU law, and international law, as well as politics, all five dimensions speak to the same central message: the UK government does not have a free hand in its approach to Brexit negotiations, and will have to engage with a variety of internal and external actors in the Brexit process in order to ensure that the process complies with the UK's existing legal and constitutional obligations, and more widely, to ensure that fundamental questions regarding the legitimacy of the process are adequately addressed.
Existing litigation concerning consent
The first two consent issues listed above, concerning the UK Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly, are the subject of two different litigation processes in London and Belfast. 
The Belfast litigation
The Belfast litigation goes significantly beyond the London litigation. Its starting point is similar, in that it argues that the Royal Prerogative has been displaced by the Northern Ireland Act 1998, read in conjunction with the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. It is argued that the UK government must seek and obtain a legislative consent motion (LCM) from the Northern Ireland Assembly (as established, the litigants argue, by convention). In the alternative, it is argued that any exercise of the Royal Prerogative is constrained by various provisions of Northern Ireland legislation and public law, including the Northern Ireland Act.
In the Belfast litigation, the arguments are both legal and political. The main legal argument is that if the UK government has the power to exercise the Royal Prerogative in the context of Brexit, this has the potential to affect the legislative capacity of the Northern Ireland
Assembly under the Northern Ireland Act. It is argued that the consent principle is the central principle in the Good Friday Agreement: reflected legally through the legislative consent motion (LCM) required to permit the UK Parliament to enact legislation on a devolved issue over which the Northern Ireland Assembly has regular legislative authority.
The Belfast litigation therefore concerns whether the courts are in a position to declare the existence of a convention for the use of an LCM, and whether such convention should be implemented (it is therefore a declaratory order, not a mandatory order).
As regards rights protection, the Belfast litigation argues that Brexit would affect the central commitment in the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) to ensuring rights protection in Northern
Ireland equivalent to the ECHR. This is because this equivalence is achieved in Northern
Ireland through overlapping protection provided by both the Human Rights Act 1998 and through EU law itself. The overall political argument relates to the considerable concern in Northern Ireland that the GFA, which underpins the enduringly fragile peace settlement, will be weakened by Brexit and may be subjected to such strains that it will fall apart, with obvious implications (especially for human rights) if the conflict is renewed.
One concrete example is the issue of equality legislation, which is a clear 'flash point' for discord between the main parties in the consociational government: Brexit would mean that more responsibility for equality legislation, where the EU is currently a dominant actor, would be transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly, thereby increasing the likelihood of friction between the main governing parties and threatening the peace settlement itself.
Update: The High Court of Northern Ireland judgment of 28 October 2016
One The text of the judgment is available at: http://bit.ly/2fN1ZXF.
Consent of the Scottish Parliament
Third, the question of issuance of an LCM was also discussed in the context of the Scottish Parliament, under the Scotland Act 2016 (which places the Sewel convention concerning consent on a statutory footing). Two possible scenarios were noted:
(i) Westminster would proceed without seeking an LCM; or (ii) Westminster, having sought and failed to obtain an LCM, would nevertheless proceed with triggering Article 50, possibly triggering a constitutional crisis (which might be defined as contestation that the constitution itself cannot resolve.) It was also noted that a similar provision is found in the Wales Act.
The Sewel convention
The Sewel convention first appeared as an aspect of the Scotland Act 1998, which established the devolution settlement for Scotland. The Memorandum of Understanding (the main intergovernmental agreement) set out the convention as follows in para.14:
The United Kingdom Parliament retains authority to legislate on any issue, whether devolved or not. It is ultimately for Parliament to decide what use to make of that power. However, the UK Government will proceed in accordance with the convention that the UK Parliament would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters except with the agreement of the devolved legislature. The devolved administrations will be responsible for seeking such agreement as may be required for this purpose on an approach from the UK Government.
The Scotland Act 2016 has amended section 28 of the Scotland Act 1998 by adding the following statement: "But it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament."
The EU law dimension to consent
The fourth point regarding consent, which has been raised in the Belfast litigation, is that the triggering and operation of Article 50 TEU in all its stages is a matter of EU law. It is a treaty-based provision that the UK is authorised to initialise, but governed by EU law. To date, the assumption in both the London and Belfast litigation has been that the triggering of Article 50 cannot be reversed, save through the unanimous agreement of all EU Member
States. If it were to be case that Article 50 cannot be rescinded, this implies that much of the implications of triggering Article 50 (e.g. a 'hard Brexit') would be out of the hands of the UK Parliament, not in terms of domestic law, but as matter of EU law. This would be a question for the ECJ and is not being ruled out right now.
Consent of the Republic of Ireland under the Good Friday Agreement
A fifth, and much more tentative, potential consent issue concerning Brexit arises in the context of the relationship between the UK and the Republic of Ireland under the Good Friday Agreement, which is an international treaty registered with the United Nations (by the government of the Republic of Ireland).
Consent of the government and people of the Republic of Ireland
In the Republic of Ireland some have raised the possibility that Brexit may be so fundamental to the Good Friday Agreement that it requires renegotiation of the Agreement; essentially requiring the UK government to consult the government of Ireland before pulling out of the EU. 12 Under the Irish Supreme Court's Crotty judgment, 13 a popular referendum could possibly also be needed on the basis that Brexit would alter the EU treaties (although this is far from clear).
The Supreme Court of Ireland's Crotty judgment
In its landmark 1987 judgment in Crotty v An Taoiseach, concerning ratification of the Single European Act, the Supreme Court laid down a general principle that a constitutional amendment is necessary whenever the government wishes to ratify any EU treaty which would go beyond the "essential scope or objectives" of the existing EU treaties. A popular referendum is required for any amendment of the Constitution.
The Good Friday Agreement and EU law
The Good Friday Agreement may also bring EU law into play in a manner that has not yet been fully considered: Given that the UK will remain a member of the EU until exit is achieved, a question would arise -which could come before the ECJ -regarding the obligations on the UK to uphold an agreement with another Member State which affects EU law. This point was not pursued in detail at the Workshop.
Part III
Constitutional Complexity Introduction
As the above discussion suggests, complexity transpired as the leitmotif of the workshop.
The existing legal and institutional framework for the protection of human rights in the UK is a multi-layered system that cuts across both devolved and reserved competences in the context of devolution, and which is based on, and affected by, international treaties which the United Kingdom has ratified, particularly the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the Good Friday Agreement.
More broadly, discussion of both Brexit and the issue of a British Bill of Rights reveal the sheer complexity of the British legal order after decades of incremental changes and constitutional fudges. Evidently, all European legal orders have become more complex due to the increasing influence of Europe-wide constitutional structures, but the UK legal order is exceptionally complex.
Constitutional ignorance
Despite this complexity -or perhaps because of it -it was repeatedly recognised, or implied, that a form of 'constitutional illiteracy, naïveté, or arrogance' is a key factor driving current policy developments in the political arena, which present constitutional questions in excessively simple form, and which tend to present simple solutions to perceived institutional problems.
To date, the UK government's approach to Brexit in particular appears to have elided the constitutional complexity involved; to seek to cut through the multiple Gordian knots rather than attempt to untangle them. Similarly, scrapping of the Human Rights Act and introduction of a BBR has been presented as a rather simple process. 
Additional government proposals
Two specific policy proposals discussed at the Workshop further evince this 'constitutional illiteracy' and misconceptions concerning the nature of the UK's human rights obligations under international treaties: a) reductions in the protection against extradition and deportation; and b) restriction of the extraterritorial application of UK human rights law.
Government proposals regarding extradition and deportation
Regarding the extradition of criminals, or more broadly the deportation of foreign nationals who have committed crimes in the UK, it was emphasised that we have no clear understanding of how a British Bill of Rights (BBR) would be drafted in this area: the main information here is restricted to pronouncements in the Conservative Party Manifesto and previous documents produced by the Conservative Party setting out concerns regarding the Human Rights Act.
These documents do not contain legal analysis, and do not acknowledge that it would be very hard to depart from the existing rights framework in any significant way while remaining compliant with the ECHR. For instance, the stated Conservative policy that any foreign national who takes the life of another cannot rely on the right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR to challenge deportation amounts to a blanket ban. Given that blanket bans are viewed with considerable suspicion by the European Court of Human Rights, such a provision could bring a BBR into conflict with the Court in Strasbourg.
Government proposals to restrict extraterritorial application of ECHR to military activities
Regarding restriction of the extraterritorial application of UK human rights law to military activities, the Prime Minister in her speech at the Conservative Party Conference in 
Implications of Brexit and these specific government proposals
Should the above be the case, we would not only have a 'Great Repeal Bill' in the Brexit context, but a 'Great Retreat' from international human rights protection, with a shift from the Brighton Declaration agenda focused on a form of UK dialogue with the Strasbourg
Court to an agenda focused on freeing the UK from the Court.
Brexit, in this way, not only opens the door to withdrawal from the EU, but from the wider system of rights supervision centred on the ECHR. 16 For some participants, this reflects the overall position of a government that is not only engaged in political calculations as to whether submission to external European human rights supervision is 'worth it' on balance, but a government that does not wish to deal with constraints of any nature on its power, which is provoking a real 'rule of law' crisis.
In this connection, it was noted that UK withdrawal from the ECHR system would be likely to lead to withdrawal from the Council of Europe, which would significantly undermine the UK's reputation as a state that cares about human rights protection. 
Other significant questions raised at the Workshop
Other questions raised at the workshop, which further underscore the constitutional complexity surrounding Brexit and a BBR included:
 How will the government's Brexit proposals address the reality of acquired (EU) rights? (this could arise in, for instance, the significant damage caused by Brexit to commercial interests).
 Does the Westminster Parliament have the organisational capacity to effectively oversee the Brexit process? (it was noted, for instance, that it has a much smaller cohort of legal advisors than government).
 Would a British Bill of Rights necessarily be accompanied by repeal of the HRA? (the Republic of Ireland, which has both a constitutional bill of rights and a Human Rights Act, suggests that the two are not necessarily incompatible).
 How can we attempt to address the real problem of a 'democratic deficit' in the context of rights supervision, without resorting to simplistic solutions?
 If the people are to be viewed as key constitutional actors, how do we address significant problems concerning knowledge of, and widespread misperceptions of, human rights and the constitution more broadly?
 How do human rights defenders address, in particular, the sense of alienation felt by individuals toward human rights, and the problem that 'human rights' itself has become a problematic, even toxic, term?
Part IV
Community Introduction
Finally, if consent relates to the need for Brexit negotiations in particular to incorporate the interests of Northern Ireland, and the other nations of the UK, 'community' as a term is used here to denote the wider implications of Brexit and a British Bill of Rights for the European community beyond the boundaries of the UK.
Brexit and the wider context of EU Member States
As regards Brexit, participants noted the broader European context that this is the first time
Article 50 TEU will be (or might be) triggered. In the event that legal issues concerning Brexit comes before the ECJ for judgment, that Court will not address such issues solely insofar as they relate to the UK.
Rather, with the rise of populism and calls for 'exit' in states such as France and the Netherlands, the ECJ will likely take a contextual approach that addresses these risks. In other words, should issues of EU law come before the ECJ in the context of the Brexit process, the Court will not decide the issue solely on the basis of how EU law relates to the UK's legal and political order.
The wider implications of withdrawal from the ECHR on the UK's neighbours
As regards a British Bill of Rights, it was recognised at the workshop that although Brexit is very unlikely to lead to a collapse of the EU, there is a real risk that UK withdrawal from ECHR system could lead to the collapse of that system, by triggering a rush for the exit by Participants noted that the purpose of the ECHR system is to provide a collective defence of rights, and that the current tendency to view the value of adherence to the ECHR in cold, transactional terms does not reflect its original purpose.
Conclusion
A number of preliminary conclusions could be drawn from the Workshop: the clear risk of a regression in rights reduction in the context of Brexit and a BBR; significant questions surrounding the search for a more democratically legitimate approach to rights protection; and the real wider threats posed by current developments: to the fragile peace in Northern Ireland; and to the rights protection (albeit limited) provided by the ECHR system in other European states.
The most fundamental conclusion from the workshop is that the current governmental approach to Brexit and a British Bill of Rights does not adequately appreciate, or address, the extraordinary complexity of human rights protection in the UK, which enmeshes protections across the international, EU, State, devolved, and bilateral planes. Until, and unless, policy formation begins to fully grapple with this complexity, serious rule of law and legitimacy questions will hang over the solutions presented by the Conservative government to the current constitutional entanglement.
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.. The Supreme Court's judgment brought to the fore some of the constitutional complexities highlighted in this paper. Importantly, it did not resolve the issues of consent identified.
Instead these questions were left unresolved -and perhaps even unresolvable -with the Supreme Court holding that neither it nor any other court was competent to decide on the operation of the Sewel Convention. This confines the question of consent to the sphere of politics without anybody of making an authoritative decision in this regard. 
